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Preventive police action, considered 
sufficient for preventing robberies, 
has no way of distinguishing bet-
ween criminals and citizens. 
- Editorial criticizing police pre-
judice in randomly searching bus 
passengers. Uornnl do Brasil 9 May 
1982)1 
Introduction 
Rio de Janeiro has always had an uneasy 
relationship with its hinterlands. Ever since 
freed slaves first built Jave/as with impro-
vised materials atop Morro da Providencia hill 
overlooking the city in the late nineteenth 
century, it has never been clear what the re-
lationship between the "Wonderful City," as 
Rio de Janeiro is affectionately known, and 
its surrounding slums ought to be. On the 
one hand, eli tes and reformers have histori-
cally seen the slums as a place of moral de-
generacy. Municipal leaders have initiated a 
variety of "civilizing" projects aimed at 
"bringing in" this periphery, and these have 
ranged over the years from vaccination and 
hygiene programs to fnveln urbanization pro-
grams, and more recently, to aggressive se-
curity campaigns. On the other hand, it is 
from the slums that much of Rio de Janeiro's 
allure originates: Sn111bn, Cnrnnvnl, soccer 
players who learned to play in the streets, 
the nwlntn.2 In 1980, this metropolis of five 
million had almost a million of its citizens 
living in one of the 500 or so fnvelns scattered 
throughout the urban landscape (Caval-
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lieri). By then, the term "urban hinterland" had become a metaphor for 
the urban condition of the poor: while Jave/as were described in every-
day speech as part of an "urban periphery" or "hinterland" that "sur-
rounded" the city,favelas occupied all parts of the city, often rubbing up 
against wealthy neighborhoods. 
The symbolic struggle to define the city-faveln relationship and its 
shifting geographical boundaries has always been bound up with fun-
damental questions of entitlement, power, and exclusion in Rio de 
Janeiro. In this article, I examine public debates about urban problems 
during the early years of the transition to democracy in Brazil {1977-
1982) to illustrate the ways in which these debates constituted symbolic 
contestations over the boundaries of inclusion into civil society. I argue 
that the influx of migrants, growing fear of crime, and the uncertainties 
of the political transition put the citizenship of the poor into doubt by 
questioning their "proper place," their social entitlements, and their 
civil rights. In Rio de Janeiro, dominant discourses of criminality and 
poverty constructed a map of the city in a way that posed the impossi-
bility of any eventual integration of slum-dwellers into the city proper, 
and by extension, of endowing the poor with the rights and ent itle-
ments of citizenship in Democratic Brazil. 
On the eve of Brazil's full transition to democracy, discussions 
about "fear of crime" and "urban poverty" in Rio de Janeiro served as 
sites for the symbolic construction of the non-citizenship of the poor, 
and helped legitimate their exclusion and violent repression in the new 
democracy. The symbolic construction of non-citizenship in Rio de 
Janeiro is evinced by three distinct but interrelated discourses. First, 
geographical imagery presented the city as besieged. Public debates 
continually posed the question of the place of the poor, and crime was 
explained as the result of the poor being "out of place." Jnstead of a vi-
sion of the poor belonging to a specific place in the ci ty, this was a vi-
sion of the city invaded by an external threat. Second, crimina lity was 
framed in terms of "demographic" as opposed to moral or medical dis-
courses. Demographic explanations for crime differ from moral expla-
nations in that they do not call for individual treatment or survei ll ance, 
but rather expulsion, separation, and elimination . Finally, the appear-
ance of a new type of criminal was posited, one whose reform was 
deemed impossible and thus should not be subject to traditional disci-
plinary practices. As will be argued below, these discourses do not 
align with disciplinary discourses ca lling for the survei llance, indi-
viduation, and reform of criminals and the poor (Foucault 1977). 
Rather, they bear closer resemblances to discourses of "massive divi-
sions" that characterize pre-disciplinary power regimes. 
Tracing these discourses and their shift toward a non-disciplinary 
regime in Rio de Janeiro during Brazil's democratic transition is the ob-
ject of this essay. In order to do so, I analyze the discourses and signify-
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ing practices through which a number of "official" voices have con-
structed dominant representations of the city and its inhabitants.3 To 
study the construction and contestation of citizenship and public prob-
lems requires the self-conscious study of official fora. Some of the most 
cited "discussants" in this public cultural conversation were govern-
ment and security officials, politicians, police chiefs (delegados), crimi-
nologists, and public defenders. For this research, then, I consider 
citations, stories, editorials, and letters from both major newspapers in 
Rio de Janeiro (0 G/obo, Jornal do Brasil), available transcriptions from 
discussions in the legislature, and official reports.4 
Citizenship and the Cultural Geography of Fear 
Thinkers from Max Weber and Georg Simmel onward have pointed 
to the historical importance of the urban bases of citizenship claims. 
City-based m ntalitics make possibl the kind of civility implicit in citi-
zenship, while the anonymity of urban ways of life requires citizenship 
because of the need for impersonal standards to regulate interactions 
among strangers. Herc I wish to make a case for a study of citizenship 
thal is grounded in contested meanings of urban space. As urban so-
cial, political, and economic transformations call forth questions of citi-
zcnshi p, answers to those questions bring about partial resolutions and 
(rc)constructions of citizenship through discussions about the city and 
its problems. The limits and content of citizenship, what it means, and 
to whom it applies, are invariably implicated with the discourses and 
signifying practices through which representations of urban space are 
constructed. As new meanings emerge about urban space and about 
what kinds of persons live and are allowed in it, citizenship is bounded 
and reconstructed. Understanding the discursive shifts i11 these con-
structions becomes a crucial component of attempts to recover any 
liberatory and democratic potential in citizenship itself. 
I draw upon insights of both cultural geography and social theory 
for tools to understand the contested nature of urban space and its im-
plications for citizenship. Social theorists have in recent years reas-
serted the importance of space for a variety of social processes. 
Following Lefevbre, de Certeau, Harvey, Soja (1989), and others, it has 
become commonplace to maintain that space is constituted by and con-
stitutive of social action. Influenced by cultural studies scholarship that 
examines the importance of contestation over cultural forms and mean-
ings, cultural geography has shown that meanings of space are always 
subject to ongoing negotiation and contestation. In the late capitalist 
metropolis, space has become particularly contested in light of the 
transformations, instabilities, and upheavals associated with uneven 
flows of capital, information, and people (Harvey; Castells 1996, 1997, 
2000).s Because of these instabilities, and because n1eanings and repre-
sentations of space arc always open to challenge and r -interpretation 
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by transgressive or subversive practices, there is always "symbolic 
work" that attempts to re-inscribe dominant meanings and representa-
tions in the face of these challenges (Cresswell 1996). Urban space is 
therefore criss-crossed with dominant projects of class, race, gender, 
and cultural hierarchies (Gregory). 
Cultural geographers have examined the linkages between sym-
bolic representations of space and relations of power and dominance 
within a variety of contexts.6 Of particular salience here are studies that 
expose how representations of the city inscribe "geographies of exclu-
sion" (Sibley), and how exclusionary geographies are organized 
around dominant constructions of place (Cresswell 1996, 1997). Domi-
nant discourses of criminality and deviance are important ways of or-
dering the social world by defining an "other" against which dominant 
norms are measured and valorized. Likewise, dominant constructions 
of a city's spaces as dangerous, deviant, or undesirable have b en es-
tablished as one of the most important ways of culturally mapping the 
city, both in official or mass media sources and in "everyday talk" 
(Caldeira 2000). Defining city places as dangerous, threatening, dirty, 
or disorderly constructs persons from those places as threatening, espe-
cially when they are deemed to be "out of place" (Cresswell 1996, 
1997). 
Sociologists and political theorists have also sought to interrogate 
the geography of citizenship and its place-based meanings (Somers; 
Brown). Chantal Mouffe, for example, suggests that we understand 
"citizen" as not only a legal category but also a form of identity result-
ing from competition among conflicting discourses (Laclau and 
Mouffe; Mouffe 1992, 1993). These discourses aim to fix the meaning of 
citizenship, what groups of persons it extends to, and what aspects of 
the common good ought to extend to them, resulting in structuring 
what Mouffe calls political spaces- the political "inside" and "outside" 
implicit in the construction of identities (1993, 69-71). The identity of 
"citizen" is a construction that is neither ready-made nor necessarily 
stable, but it is always organized around exclusionary oppositions to 
its constitutive outside through the "determination of an other" (1992, 
2). As discourses "fix" the boundaries of the political community, and 
between citizens (bearers of rights) and non-citizens, the boundary be-
tween the two becomes disputed. As discourses that ex tend or shorten 
the reach of citizenship are deployed, new justifications are given and 
new "others" are constructed; the resu lt is that, particularly at times of 
regime changes and realignments, there are intense contestations over 
ambiguous and unstable "frontier effects" at the boundary of this po-
litical space as new configurations of citizenship call forth new outsid-
ers (1992, 134). 
As these" frontiers" were called into question in Rio de Janeiro du r-
ing Brazil's democratic transition, new discourses were summoned to 
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re-stabilize their boundaries. But what was unique to discussions about 
the city and its problems at this time was that they underwent a shift 
away from constructing social problems as individual problems and to-
ward other sorts of explanations. While individual failings call for indi-
vidualized interventions and surveillance- the kind of "panopticist" 
disciplinary techniques Foucault describes as part of modem regimes 
of power-demographic explanations that explain crime as a by-prod-
uct of excess population call forth responses of division, separation, 
and population control, and pose the impossibility of these "excess per-
sons" enjoying the benefits of citizenship. Instead of descriptions of 
slums as places of moral degeneracy, descriptions began to emphasize 
the virus-like growth and multiplication of the poor. Similarly, repre-
sentations of the city moved away from a gradated, disciplinary vision, 
in which each class or group has a proper place, to a vision of the city as 
"invad d." And inst ad of pointing to the importance of disciplinary 
r form inside prisons, these discourses focused attention upon and 
magnifi d th pr val nee of highly dangerous and irreformable crimi-
nals. 
These discourses do not follow a "disciplinary logic" but rather a 
"logic of inclusion/exclusion." As Foucault writes, these are opposing 
logics characterized by the difference between the ideal of Benthamism 
(disciplinary) and the ideal of the "city besieged by the plague" (non-
disciplinary). According to Foucault, "rather than the massive, binary 
division between one set of people and another, [Benthamism] called 
for multiple separations, individualizing distributions, an organization 
in depth of surveillance and control" (1979, 198). While some scholars 
have pointed to periods of co-existence between disciplinary and non-
disciplinary discourses, this has genera lly been addressed in the con-
text of colonial histori s.7 Little work exists that traces instances of 
shifts, as J do here, away from disciplinary regimes. The fact that this 
Lakes place during Brazil's transition to democracy is particularly sig-
nificant, as it reveals contradictions in the democratization process it-
self. Att ntion to discourses about the city and its places brings 
attention to fact that the transi tion to a formal democracy was part of a 
process of the re-organization of citizenship that, in significant ways, 
drew boundaries around the political community that were ultimately 
more exclusionary, despite the demands of social movements. 
Earlier Disciplinary Discourses 
Early efforts to address urban problems in Rio de Janeiro, such as 
the Pinna Agnc/1e urban plan of 1930, were already dealing with a land-
scape "polluted" by irregular housing (Stuckenbruck). By the 1950s, 
public discussions about the slums wer describing in oppositional 
terms the r lationship betwe n the hinterlands and the civilizing 
project taken up by the city.8 Reformist concerns in the 1950s and 1960s 
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tended toward "moral" and medical explanations for poverty that em-
phasized individual pathology and prescribed integration, moral re-
generation, and education as solutions. Social service efforts in Rio de 
Janeiro, such as by the catholic charitable organization, Fundn9no Leno 
XII, intervened into the social life, family life, and education of the poor 
to prevent them from falling into criminal ways, and they were 
strongly encouraged by the government until the 1960s (Pino). A typi-
cal government report from 1957 describes the Javela as "an area of dis-
integration, maladjustment, and disharmony easily set apart by its 
seemingly chaotic and asymmetrical geometry," (30) but it also men-
tions that: 
[the] Javelado is a hard worker of strong spirit, whose only fault is 
scepticism. There is no definitive or marked sociological 
characteristic to be attributed to the slum-dweller. (Goulart 31) 
The report goes on to note that the slum-dweller has a noble savagery 
about him: "women are not as likely to have abortions as some rich 
ones" (32), the family of the Jave/ado is stronger (37), and the Jnvelndos 
live in a racial harmony that is not present in many other places (35); 
though the Javelado is a victim, "he is not irreligious" (38), and grea t so-
cial progress is promised by the intervention of the church. Similarly, 
other social reports of the time emphasized paternalistic but reformist 
solutions to the Javelados' social ills. 
As Schwarcz documents, in the earlier part of the century eugenic 
theories had gained currency in Brazil as a branch of medicine, par-
tially as a result of the success of sanitation medicine campaigns 
against cholera, yellow fever, and small pox. Elites were thus con-
cerned with, among other "social problems" of the urban poor, the fate 
of the country as a "mongrel" nation. The eugenicist Liga de l fygiene 
Mental was founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1922, and its prescriptions for 
"improving the race" involved sanitation, exercise, and socia l services 
for the urban poor. Similarly, there were paternalistic concerns with the 
"degenerating" state of the family among urban poor and working 
classes (Besse). The construction of the citizenship of the poor in Brazil 
as a whole followed the same paternalistic logic. The urban poor were 
considered wards of the tutor state and were entitled to limited social 
benefits in exchange for the performance of "socially useful" labor, a 
conception some have described as "regulated citizenship" (Santos). 
The "City of 300 Slums" and the Transition to Democracy, 
1977-1982 
If we added all of the Javelados in Rio de Janei ro we would have the 
third largest city in Brazil. -Marcos Candau, Secretary of Social 
Development. Uornal do Brasil 13 Jan. 1980) 
Viewpoints on urban problems decidedly shifted away from these 
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paternalistic concerns toward non-disciplinary exclusion in Rio de 
Janeiro and in Brazil in the late 1970s. National and city-based citizen-
ship were particularly contested during this period immediately before 
full transition to democracy in Brazil. Three factors called the limits of 
citizenship into question: the rising number of urban migrants and ur-
ban poverty, the claims of new social movements, and the visible rise of 
criminal practices in wealthy areas of cities. 
Changes in agriculture had steadily forced millions of migrants to 
urban centers since the mid-1960s, while land speculation and inflation 
drove up the cost of rental housing, forcing many working poor into 
shanty-towns (Singer; Kowarick 1980). These factors pushed the num-
ber of Jave/ados to almost three-quarters of a million out of the city's to-
tal population of five million by 1980 (Cavallieri). With Javela 
settlements on the south side of downtown literally exhausting avail-
able physical spac s, the "belt of poverty" now continued to extend 
outward to the industrial northern region of the city. The resulting 
landscape juxtaposed the Rocinha slum, housing as many as 200,000 
persons, next to wealthy neighborhoods. 
It was also during this period that the "popular pro-democracy 
movement" began to organize and stage anti-dictatorship acts in many 
urban ar as, including Rio de Janeiro. The military had ruled the coun-
try since 1964, and by the late 1970s the dictatorship had begun to show 
signs that it might consider a transition to democracy, which it under-
took in 1984. It was at this time, then, that numerous social movements 
started to more visibly organize with expectations of the eventual tran-
sition. In Rio de Janeiro, activists organized a number of neighborhood 
associations in poorer areas, as well as an umbrella organization of as-
sociations, FAMERJ, in 1979. Neighborhood associations grew from 33 
in 1978 to 166 by 1981, making claims around issues of housing, secu-
rity and public services (Boschi 1987). Progressive elements of the 
Catholic church became involved in pro-Jave/a issues and organized 
base communities at the time as well. In the country as a whole, popu-
lar protest called into question the limits of citizenship by raising issues 
such as the right to vote, the right to assemble, the right to unions, and 
the cost of living, in a series of spectacular public acts. The well-known 
strikes in the Sao Paulo industrial park in 1978 halted work for several 
hu ndred thousand workers, as the cost of living movement drew thou-
sands of people to protest.9 
A national debate about police efficiency, stricter punishments for 
criminals, the death penalty, and safety in cities was also on going at 
the time. Various scholars point to the scandalous headlines that ap-
peared in major newspapers with regular frequency during the period 
(Benevides; Cerqueira 1991). The ]or11al do Brnsil, one of the country's 
most important newspapers, inaugurated a "violence" section as well 
as a regular "violence yesterday" feature on its front cover in 1981. 
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Other newspapers also included stories and editorials about a "wave of 
insecurity" gripping major urban centers. Scandalous "real crime 
shows" on television and on the radio focused on life and events in the 
slums, while journalistic books with titles such as "Rio: City of 300 
Favelas" and "The Most Dangerous Place on Earth" hit the newstands 
(Souza). In 1980, a group of lawyers and social scientists was commis-
sioned to study the causes of urban crime, and the resulting report 
(Brazil 1980b) marked, for some analysts, the beginning of an "official 
panic" about crime (Cerqueira 1987). 
Criminal practices had in fact increased in the period, and had 
changed in spatial patterns (Coelho; Adorno 1993). Certain kinds of 
criminal behaviors started to threaten the security of previously safe 
wealthy areas, and violent crime increased in the areas where it would 
be likely to be reported as such. Whal is important abo ut this cha nge, 
however, was how it was constructed, and how these constructions jus-
tified ever-more violent reactions to crime instead of ca lling for other 
types of measures. So while homicides in Rio de Janeiro, for example, 
roughly doubled betweeen 1977 and 1981 (Coelho), a significant por-
tion of this increase was due to increasingly repressive and violent po-
lice tactics, as "death squad" killings and police executions became 
more frequent during the period (Americas Watch Committee). The 
cityJs major crime syndicate was dubbed the Comando Ven11e/'10 (The 
Red Command) by the media in an aJlusion lo communism. In April of 
1981, it was the ostensible cause for the larges t single police operation 
ever in Rio de Janeiro, a televised standoff between one of its leaders 
and four hundred policemen (Lima 1994). 
The Poor out of Place 
Criminality does not stop growing and does not have geographica l 
preferences. -Spokesperson of the Secretarial of Public Security 
arguing against special "treatment" to certain a reas. (Joma/ do Brasil 
12 Mar. 1980) 
All of these changes described above-the numbers of poor mi-
grants, the transition to democracy and new social movements, and the 
changing perceptions of crime-seemed to blur the city-Jave/a bound-
ary. Concerns about this growing "other city," as a place of disorder 
and lawlessness, as a source of crime and vice, and as a source of un-
controlled growth, dominated discussions of the topic in Brazil at the 
time. The discourses summoned forth to deal with crime and poverty 
during the period are telling, in that they represented a decided shift 
from earlier discourses. 
Rio de Janeiro in the Jate 1970s was characterized by its discursive 
construction as besieged and surrounded on a ll sides by "belts of pov-
erty" or "belts of insecurity." Against a vision of specific places in the 
city for the poor, as in Haussman's plan for Paris, this was a vision of 
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the city choked by these belts, with its poor circulating alarmingly 
freely throughout it. The movement of the poor into certain areas of the 
city posed the question of their "proper place," of where the poor ought 
lo live and circulate, and of their place in society at large. 
The answer ultimately given, that these persons had no place in the 
city, implied that they were beyond the boundaries of the benefits of 
citizenship. Earlier versions of urban planning and reform in Rio de 
Janeiro enta iled gradated forms of entitlements, whereas this version 
only re-inscribed total non-entitlement. Murilo Maldonado, a Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party (MOB) state deputy, expressed this dis-
cursive shift by sum moning some fantastic numbers about the invasion 
of city streets by hordes of criminals and potential criminals (aban-
doned minors) against an ill-equipped police force. He inquired, "how 
can you police well with a badly equipped and badly paid police in a 
ci ty with mor than 150,000 aba ndoned minors and 30,000 condemned 
criminals in lib rty?" (0 Globo 6May1979). 
A typica l explanation for crime was that the poor were out of place 
and in loo close proximity lo wealth. "Poor people out of place" were 
bound lo feel a sense of frustra tion by virtue of being near the rich, 
which can engender crime. Attila de Souza Leao Andrade jr., a Rio de 
Janeiro lawyer, wrote in an edi torial : 
Bra/ilian Society has transformed itself in the last decades into one 
of the most voracious materialist societies in history .... An ever 
grea ter number of people begin to desire an ever greater number of 
things in a world of scarcity and insufficiency .... The result is the 
advent of a sentiment of collective frus tra tion that results in 
violence. (}omni rlo Brnsil 22 Jan. 1980) 
Social science pundits were not loo far behind in "theorizing" the re-
sults of this contact. The 1980 report on criminality cited above blamed 
not only the relative proximity of the rich and poor but also its virtual 
analogue in the media, which allowed the poor to see the lifestyle of the 
rich . Television was blamed for propagating "a consumerist culture 
that exacerbates unlimited desire of always having more" (Brazil 
1980b, 279), leading lo the "aggravation of pa tho logical factors, increas-
ing the likelihood of crime" (294). Some authors of the study pointed to 
"the visibility of relative social inequities in urban settings" (299) as a 
more powerful determinant of crime than absolute poverty itself, and 
worried about the " the mental shock of the mother who leaves her hun-
gry chi ldren in the fn vela to clean the kitchen of the elite family" (300). 
Television and media influences were often cited as a cause of crime by 
showing both impossibly wealthy lifestyles and "criminal ways" to 
achieve them. Director of Metropolitan Police Heraldo Gomes ex-
plained: 
What occurs is the law of imitation, bccnusc man has the tendency 
to imitate good acts and bad acts, and by watching "canned films" 
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on television winds up copying the actions of bandits and acting 
like them. Uornnl do Brasil 10 Oct. 1980) 
At one point, Minister of Justice Ibrahim Abi-Ackel even suggested a 
"gentleman's agreement" to television station owners to curb the 
showing of films that "could induce violence" Uornal do Brasil 22 Jan. 
1980). 
These discourses proposed that the poor were out of place, and as 
result of that "mis-placement", they began to imagine lifestyles they 
should not aspire to. "Urban violence" in Brazil became, as Cerqueira 
(1987) points out, a site to discuss concrete social conflicts at the time of 
the transition to democracy. All of the ways to "solve crime" were inti-
mately tied to dimensions of citizenship: as criminal acts represented 
violations against the private property of the wealthy, they raised the 
question of the social citizenship and entitlements of the poor. As Gen-
eral Reynaldo Mello de Almeida conceded," extensive policing is a pal-
liative, not an action. The solution will be difficult to find, because the 
economic problem will never be solved. In this place there will always 
be rich and poor" ( 0 Globo 8 Jan. 1981). 
These urban issues forced the question of the limits of citizenship: 
what responsibility does the state have toward the poor? Are poor per-
sons entitled to full civil rights? Exclusionary responses to such ques-
tions relied on notions of the poor being "out of place" and made 
possible a transition to what Morse and Hardey have called a condition 
of "permanent marginality," in which the number of poor in cities is 
such that official concerns transformed from a search for solutions to 
poverty to a search for methods of its containment. Another important 
part of this shift was the departure from moral explana tions for crime. 
Demographic Explanations 
These geographical images, of a city besieged, of the poor out of 
place, of belts of poverty, were intimately tied to "demographic" dis-
courses of criminality, in contrast to a purely "moral" ones. Moral ex-
planations for crime and the poor admit the possibility of reform, as the 
individual criminal's conscience can be reached by intervention, while 
purely "demographic" explanations deny such a possibility. A typical 
statement of this demographic discourse is found in the National De-
velopment Plan, which explained "crime" in terms of "urban growth": 
As a result of the negative reflexes of rapid urban growth on the 
quality of life, most markedly in the larger metropolitan areas, the 
improvement of security services in these metropolises becomes of 
eminent importance. (Brazil 1980a, 153) 
Part of the problem seemed to be the uncontrollability and mobility of 
the poor: internal migrations have "direct repercussions in certain 
types of crime, making contraband trade easier, facilitating drug traf-
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ficking, and enabling the evasion of delinquents" (Brazil 1980a, 185). 
Similarly, in the special report commissioned by the Justice Depart-
ment, the causes of crime were explained as a product of "a generalized 
neurosis that seems be a constant of Homo Urbanus of our times" (Brazil 
1980b, 178). Crime, supposedly though a natural propensity of "man's 
nature, of his society and of his culture" (185), was brought about by 
the urban conditions that make crime more attractive to many. Another 
report, the Regino Metropolitana do Grande Rio, echoed these themes, and 
went so far as to point to the specific regions from which "criminals" 
migrated: 
A large part of the criminal youth who act in the state of Guanabara 
.. . is from the areas of the Baixada Fluminense, Niteroi, Teres6polis. 
... The increase in crimes reflects the problem of insecurity of 
populations of rural origin, little adapted to urban standards. 
Violence is therefore product of structural factors: the metropolitan 
sys tem has the capaci ty to attract migrant populations, but not to 
absorb it. (Brazil 1979, 213-4) 
One implication of this kind of reasoning was that solutions depended 
on "demographic control" of the poor rather than reformist or" civiliz-
ing" solutions. A city official contended that the favored solution to this 
problem was forced family plannjng: "only those who can raise and 
educate children should have them" Uornnl do Brasil, 12 Oct. 1980). Ex-
Mayor Marcos Tamayo agreed, arguing that "a lack of national family 
planning will ... lead to a decline of already low levels of quality of 
life" (]omni do Brasil, 12 Oct. 1980). The fact that demographic dis-
courses were dominant had significant consequences for the construc-
tion of ci ti zenship of the poor. Instead of older-style "solutions" to the 
socia l problems of the poor-such as the religious interventions and so-
cia l work of the 1950s-the emphasis now became one of dealing with 
excess population without regard for individual moral reform. In addi-
tion to this, crime came to be understood in significantly different 
ways. 
New Criminalities 
If the poor were constructed as out of place in the city, and as be-
yond the intervention of traditional social services, a third type of dis-
course constructed the image of the changing nature of crime, such that 
it represented a threat to the social order that must be elin'linated. The 
"new criminal" emerged from the slums, but he represented a new 
type of threat; his motivations were not hunger or poverty, but rather 
disruption of the social order. He was likened to a "communist subver-
sive" who when incarcerated turned prisons into dens of vice. This new 
type of criminality called forth extreme responses that applied to the 
poor al large. The slum, by association, became a source of an alternate 
order that threatened the order of the city. It was in the fnveln that chil-
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dren were initiated into the world of vice and crime, bul instead of rep-
resenting an uncivilized world, as had been the case in the 1950s, lhis 
now became a world deemed to be beyond normaliza lion and integra-
tion. This is directly relevant to dimensions of citizenship: the construc-
tion of a "new criminality" is the construction of a collective identity 
that frustrates "normal" expectations of the poor and is therefore out-
side of the social contract. This in tum justifies policies and practices 
that violate civil rights in order to protect the social fabric. 
A debate in 1979 about prison reform, and a proposal to release 
prisoners with good records to free up funds, was met with a lol of 
public hostility. Attorney Paulo Torres argued against this reform on 
the basis that many "irreformable" prisoners would be released, in-
cluding some that would have thirty year sentences reduced to fifleen 
due to good behavior: 
This is a highly dangerous criminal who would never be reformed 
in such little time, especially inside a penitentiary system wilhoul 
occupation .... It would open the door to criminals, when iL would 
be more important to increase the number of prisons. (}omni do 
Brasil 25 May 1979) 
The rise of new forms of organized crime suggested to many lhal a new 
kind of response was called for. Criminologist Virgilio Donnici con-
tended that "we have entered the acute phase of crime and from now 
on it will only get worse. Today's criminals don'l act like lhe ones from 
yesteryear, and are everyday more sophislicaled" Uornnl do Brnsil 10 
Oct. 1980). Secretary of Justice Erasmo Martins Pedro concurred, argu-
ing that as many as half of all prisoners were "highly dangerous" and 
beyond reform, which for him meanl lhat "lhe federal governmenl 
should build maximum security prisons in lhe inlerior or on islands" 
Uornal do Brasil 27 Jan. 1980). 
The "new criminality" was described as resembling the threal of 
communism. One feature that distinguished this new lhreat from mere 
"chicken thievery" (Ladrao de galinhas) was that crime was no longer 
simply carried out by needy persons. A bank robbery in February of 
1980, for instance, was noted because of the "unusual characteristics of 
the criminals" who "were well dressed, did not commit violence, and 
did not use foul language Uornal do Brasil 1 Feb. 1980). IL was concluded 
that the new kind of criminaJity was motivated by the desire to disrupl 
the social order. As Francisco Gama Lima, president of lhe private se-
curity firm Agents, noted in an interview, the new criminality is not mo-
tivated by hunger, but rather by the need for "getling revenge from 
the system" Uornal do Brasil 27 Nov. 1980). 
These discourses served to construct the image of a particularly 
threatening internal enemy. An armed confrontation belween a famous 
criminal, Jose Jorge Saldanha, and members of lhe police escalated to a 
standstill for severa l hours. The spectacular confrontation between the 
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lone heavily armed criminal, trapped in the third floor of an apartment, 
and as many as four hundred policemen, came on the heels of a "wave" 
of bank robberies allributed to the Comando Ven11elho (Armorim; Lima 
1994). As one of lhe partners of the besieged fugitive later reported: 
The hunting season against us was open; we were completely 
demonized. The words are not innocent: we were "commandos" ... 
and if this wasn't enough, we were also "red," an adjective that 
awakens old and mortal reflexes in the police and in the military. 
(Lima 1991, 45) 
A deputy in congress distinguished between old and new styles of 
crime, and the ways in which the new style of crime violated tradi-
Lional boundaries, unlike the kinds of crimes: 
Which havl.? always happened since Cain and Abel, for various 
motive<> including thl.? defense of honor and of life. [Today there is] 
•.. ,1 terror that leads thousands of families not Lo leave their homes 
al night, fearing the worst. (Discursos 110 Co11gresso Nncio11nl fl 5 Oct. 
1980) 
No longer confined to the city's slums, this form of criminality was 
"oul of place." lls molives were different than simple need, criminals 
were no longer reformable, and the responses to lhis sort of crime, as 
wilh olhcr lhrca ls lo lhe social order such as communist infiltration, 
needed lo be more swift and decisive. 
Non-Citizens and Incomplete Panopticisms 
Taken logelhcr, discourses that constructed the poor as invading 
lhc city, thal off cred demographic explanations of criminality, ~nd ~hat 
construcled lhc image of "a new criminality," had profound 1mphca-
lions for lhe cilizenship of the poor in lhe new democracy. Representa-
lions of lhe poor as being "out of place" constructed their 
non-ci tizenship by relegating them to areas beyond the reach of the 
stale and by reinscribing their lack of social entitlement. Demographic 
explanations for crime denied the possibility of reform and precluded 
disciplinary s lrategies aimed at the poor. And discursive constructions 
of the new criminal justified increasingly violent punishments and the 
withholding of civil rights from the poor. Wh.ile changes in. ~he 
country's polilical and economic landscape at the time of the transition 
lo democracy implicitly and explicitly raised several questi~ns about 
lhe limits of cilizenship, lhese discourses offered very exclus10nary an-
swers. Preventative arrests were made lega l in 1980, and in 1981, legis-
lation imposed preventative arrests for minors accused of crimes. 
Extensive policing, and a greater presence of police forces in public 
spaces, was also implemented in 1981. That same ye~1r, the f'.tnJ ~yste1~! Refor111, which expcdiled punishment and ended the e cess1ve nghts 
of the accused, was enacled. ln terms of deaths al the hands of the state, 
Brazil now has one of lhe highest death rates in the world, despite hav-
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ing no formal death penalty (Americas Watch Committee). 
Economic changes or increased crime do not in themselves explain 
calls for the reduction of civil rights or the expulsion of the poor from 
city centers. These calls were the result of signifying practices which 
functioned, as I have argued, as "cultural maps" of citizenship. This at-
tention to cultural contestations over the meanings of the city's spaces 
has led to a focus on the" frontier effects" of citizenship, that is, the lim-
its of its entitlements. Cultural contestations over "frontier effects" are 
intimately tied to meanings of place, and the "political inside and out-
side" that is the subject of these contestations becomes linked to discur-
sive mappings of who belongs to what places. Just as Mouffe argues 
that the political identity of "citizen" implies in its construction the 
boundaries of a political space, it becomes possible to understand that 
contestations over citizenship imply boundaries and meanings about 
place.s, ai:d that, ~o.nvers~ly, debates over boundaries and places imply 
certam kmds of citizenships. In this case, the symbolic practices J have 
examined here served to "cut off" poor residents from full entillemenl 
as citizens. 
Certainly, Rio de Janeiro in 1980 does not stand alone as a city with 
spaces constructed as "besieged" and invaded by dangerous elements 
beyond the reach of disciplinary tactics. The symbolic construction of 
European metropolises invaded by immigrants, or of North American 
suburbs invaded by non-white urban criminals, not to mention the fear 
of crime in many Latin American capitals, represent similar construc-
tio~s. As authors who have taken up the concept of "moral panic" have 
pomted out, such panics tend to arise in periods of economic crisis 
(Cohen; Hall, et al.). Yet while the Jate 1970s was a period of downward 
mobility of the middle class, and more importantly, of uncertainly 
about the future, economic explanations are inadequate as downward 
trends were present much earlier. A more complete explanation would 
also have to include the uncertainties associated with the transition to 
democracy and with the future of the city. In a sense, the transition 
away fro~ .a dictatorship also meant a transition away from ordered 
and safe cities and very fixed political horizons.10 
A further component needs to be addressed, however. Although 
geographers have taken up Foucault's (1986) scant writings on "hetero-
topia" or places of alternate ordering (Shields; Soja 1990), scholars have 
only recently be?u.n to explore incomplete d isciplinary projects, and 
the ways that this mcompleteness may make disciplinary projects un-
stable (Stewart). Disciplinary projects are never fully realized and 
never occupy all space. Strategies of enumeration, such as censuses or 
~f discipline, ~uc~ as prisons, have notoriously always been incomplete 
m Brazil and 1n R10 de Janeiro (Chalhoub; Meade). "Proletarian Parks," 
for instance, were designed and built in Rio de Janeiro in the 1940s as a 
strategy to discipline workers and included mandatory lectures over 
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loudspeakers about public morality. Only three such complexes were 
ever built and they did not function for very long (Conniff 1981). Fur-
thermore, penitentiaries were always underfunded, and human rights 
activists began conducting a census of Rio de Janeiro's prisons in the 
1990s due to the Jack of complete institutional records (America's 
Watch Committee). 
But panopticism has been incomplete in Brazil for another reason. 
Elites have always had an uneasy relationship with the integration of 
non-whites and the poor into Brazilian society. As students of the his-
tory of penitentiaries in Brazil have pointed out, even reformers were 
skeptical of the possibility of fully reforming the lower rungs of Brazil-
ian society because of attributed genetic and innate deficiencies 
(Salvatore and Aguirre). The civilizing project always stood in opposi-
tion to the logic of innate deficiencies and simple exclusion, and the 
logic of the prison always xisted in tension with the logic of expulsion. 
The transi tion to democracy and the transformations of the city simply 
foregrounded the question of citizenship for those groups whose inte-
gration into the ci ty and society were always provisional. When these 
transformations raised the possibility of too many rights and of too 
much mobility into and within the city, lines of exclusion, violent pun-
ishment, and non-citi zenship were re-drawn. 
While socia l movements attempted to extend the boundaries of citi-
zenship, "non-citizenship" was constructed through cultural re-map-
pings of the city that invalidated those rights. These discourses 
constructed the poor as" not belonging" to any proper place in the city, 
save those areas beyond the reach of the state, and justified repressive 
solutions to social problems in the period of democracy.11 While social 
movements in lh late 1970s and 1980s sought to reclaim the city and 
emphasize democratic access lo urban services, these exclusionary dis-
courses made il easier for middle class residents to dismiss their claims. 
On one hand, the non-citizenship of the urban poor and their "unwor-
thiness" of rights made it difficult to construct claims that would be 
broadly accepted. Several scholars have written about the privatization 
and stark social separa tion that now characterize Brazilian cities, as 
middle class residents continue to flee public spaces for ever more ex-
clusive enclaves (Caldeira 2000). On the other hand, fnvelndos often 
drew lines between themselves and "criminals," which also mitigated 
against constructing collective claims (Zaluar 1983). 
One of the implications of this retrenchment has been the way that 
human rights reforms and activism have been discredited. The first 
democratically elected governor of Rio de Janeiro, progressive Leonel 
Brizola, attempted human rights reforms with the police, but faced a 
severe backlash from the city's residents, who then voted him out of of-
fice for a candidate on a pro-order platform. In the years following the 
events recounted here, human rights activis1n was being discredited as 
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"privilege for bandits" even as numerous viola lions of the human 
rights of fnveln residents were taking place (Caldeira 1991). A mass ex-
ecution of residents of the Vigario Geral fnveln in 1993 by off-d uty pol ice 
officers was followed in 1994 by army blitzkrieg atlacks and the occu-
pation of the entire poorer northern side of Rio de Janeiro in a fantaslic 
show of force. The mayor answered to protests from human rights 
groups by proclaiming that it made no sense to demand human rights 
in the Javelas now when no such rights had ever existed for residents of 
the Jave/as (Estado de Sao Paulo 1Nov.1994). 
158 
Pariahs of the Wonderful City 
Acknowledgments 
r wish to Lhank Lynn Spillman, Martha Huggins, Paul Lichterman, Jane 
Collins, Gay Seidman, Margaret Somers, Paula Chakravartty, Jose 
Augusto de Souza Rodrigues, Carlos Antonio Costa Ribeiro, and the 
disClosure colleclive for comments on earlier versions of this piece. All 
errors and omissions are mine. The research for this piece was partially 
funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation. 
Notes 
1. All translations from the Portuguese original were done by the author. 
2. There are many interesting studies of the city-favela relationship. See Pino, 
Chalhoub, Meade, Conniff, Gay, Boschi (1987), and Zaluar (1983). 
3. Representations of the city arc regarded here as contested and competing 
"cultural pr,1cticcs of signification rather than referential duplicates" of the 
landscape itc;t•lf (Barne~ and Duncan 5). 
4. Excluded from these were perspectives that might be used to reconstruct 
" popular" discourses, s uch as popular AM radio programs (the nationally 
syndicated Gil Gome!', for example) and popular songs or stories. 
5. As I larvey puts it, in the capitalist city, "nobody quite knows what the right 
time and place for everything might be" (239). 
6. For example, see Gregory, Barnes and Duncan, Agnew, and Shields. 
7. Sec, for instance, Rabinow, and Stoler. For Latin America, see Salvatore and 
Aguirre. There is still little work that explores this theme in more contempo-
rary periods. 
8. See, for instance, the following reports: Geiger, Guanabara State (1969), and 
Maltos. For a historical periodization of these earlier phases, see Pino (1996). 
For a discussion of the Agnchc Plan, see Stuckenbruck. 
9. On the development of the neighborhood movement in Rio de Janeiro, see 
Boschi (1982, 1987). For a discussion of the strikes, the Worker's Party, and 
social movements during the transition, see Kowarick (1994). 
10. Chantal Mouffe, for instance, suggests we understand new authoritarian 
projects in Eastern Europe as attempts to re-negotiate the insider/ outsider 
boundary thal was losl with the fall of communism (1992, 4). 
11. This is far from unique, however, when other transitions to democracy are 
considered, particularly in their spatial dimensions. For a striking parallel in 
South Africa, sec Christopher (2001). 
Works Cited 
Abreu, M. Evol11~iio Urbn11n do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: IPLANRIO, 
1987. 
Adorno, S. "A Criminilidade Urbana Violenta no Brasil: Um Recorte 
Tematico." BIB 35.1 (1993): 3-24. 
Agnew, J. Pince n11ri Politics: Tiie Geogrnpliicnl Mediation of State n11d Soci-
ety. Boslon: Al len and Unwin, 1987. 
159 
Baiocchi 
Americas Watch Committee. Violencia Policinl Urbana no Brasil: Morles 
e Torturns pela Policia en-1 Sao Paulo e Rio de Janeiro nos ulti111os cinco 
anos. New York: Americas Watch, 1993. 
Armorim, C. Comando Venne/ho. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1993. 
Barnes, T. and J. Duncan, eds. Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Meta-
phor in the Production of Landscape. London: Routlege, 1992. 
Benevides, M. Violencia, Pavo e Policia. Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983. 
Besse, S. Restructing Patriarchy. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996. 
Boschi, R. Movimentos Coletivos no Brasil Urbano. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 
1982. 
_. A Arte da Associa9ao: Politica de Base e Democrncia 110 Brasil. Sao 
Paulo: Vertice, 1987. 
Brazil. Regino Metropolitana do Grande Rio: Servi9os de /11/eresses Co11111111 . 
Brasilia : IPEA/IPLAN, 1979. 
_ . Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento Ill. Brasilia: Brasil, 1980. 
_. Criminalidade e Violencia: Relat6rio dos Grupos de Traba/ho de Ju ristas 
e Cientistas Sociais. Brasilia: Ministerio da Justic;a, 1980. 
Brown, M. Replacing Citizenship. New York: Guilford, 1997. 
Caldeira, T. "Direitos humanos ou Privilegio de Bandidos?" Novos 
Estudos CEBRAP 30 (1991): 18-31. 
_ . City a/Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in Sao Paulo. Berke-
ley: University of California, 2000. 
Castells, M. The Rise of the Network Society. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 
1996. 
Castells, M. The Power of Identity. Malden, MA: BJackweJI, 1997. 
Castells, M. End of Millennium. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000. 
Cavallieri, P. "Favelas Cariocas: Mudarn;as na infraestrutura ." Quatro 
Estudos. Ed. P. Cavallieri. Rio de Janeiro: IPLANRIO, 1986. 
Cerqueira F. Brasil Violencia & Concilia9ao no Dia a Dia. Porto Alegre: S. 
A. Fabris, 1987. 
Chalhoub, S. Trabalho, Lar e Botequim: 0 cotidiano dos Traba/hadores ILO 
Rio de Janeiro da Belle Epoque. Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986. 
Chevalier, L. Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris During the 
First Half of the Nineteenth Century. New York: H. Fertig, 1973. 
Christopher, A.J. The Atlas of Changing South Africa. London: 
Routledge, 2001. 
Coelho, E. "A Criminalidade Urbana Violenta." Dados 31.2 (1988): 145-
183. 
Conniff, M. Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populis111, 1925-1945. 
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981. 
160 
Pariahs of the Wonderful City 
Cohen, S. folk Devils and Morn/ Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rock-
ers. London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1972. 
Cresswel l, T. /11 Plnce/0111 of Pince: Geograplty, Ideologtj, and Transgression. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 
_ . "Weeds, Plagues, and Bodily Secretions." Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers 87.2 (1997): 330-345. 
Discursos no Congresso Nacional. Volume II. Brasilia: Congresso 
Nacional, 1980. 
Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: 
Vintage, 1977. 
_ . "Of Other Spaces." Diacritics 16 (1986): 22-27. 
Gay, R. Popular Orga11izntio11 and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: A Tale of 
Two rave/as. Ph iladelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. 
Geiger, P. Aspcclos do I'nlo Urbn110 110 Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto 
Brasil iro de Gcografia Estatis tica, 1961. 
Goulart, J. favclns do Dislrito federal. Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio da 
Agricultura, Scrvic;o de Informac;ao Agricola, 1957. 
Guanabara (Stat ). Cri111e5 e Co11trave119oes. Rio de Janeiro: Estado da 
Guanabara, Ministerio da Justica, 1961. 
_ . Rio, Opera~iio fnveln. Rio de Janeiro: Governo do Estado Da 
Guanabara, 1969. 
Gregory, D. Geographical f 111ngi11ntio11s. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994. 
I Iall, S., et al. Polici11g the Crisis: Muggi11g, the State, and Law and Order. 
New York: l lolmcs and Meier, 1978. 
l Iarvey, 0. Tlte Co11dilio11 of Posf111orler11ity: A11 E11quiry i11 to the Origins of 
C11/lurnl Clw11gc. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989. 
I luggins, M. from Slavery lo Vagrancy i11 Brazil: Crime and Social Control 
i11 the Tltird World. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1985. 
_ . 1991. Vigiln11 lism n11 rl lite State i11 Modern Lnti11 America: Essays on Ex-
tralegal Viole11ce. New York: Praeger, 1991. 
)or11nl do Brasil. Rio d Janeiro. Various. 
Kowarick, L. A f.spolin9iio U rbn 11 n. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 
1980. 
_ ., ed. Socinl Slr11ggles n11 rl lite City: Tl1e Case of Siio Pn11 /o. New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1994. 
Laclau, E. Polit ics n11d Jrleology i11 Marxist Tlteory: Cnpitnlis111, Fascism, 
Populism. London: NLB, 1977. 
_ .New Reflecfio11s 011 the Revo/11tio11 of011r Time. London: Verso, 1990. 
Laclau, E. and C. Mouff e. l legemo11y n11 rl Socialist Strategy. London: 
Verso, 1985. 
161 
Baiocchi 
Lefebvre, H. The Production of Space. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1991. 
Lima, R. A Policia da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro: Seus Dilemas e Parndoxos. 
Rio de Janeiro: Policia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 1994. 
Mattos, I. Detalhes de Vidas: Trabalho, Experiencias e Acontecimentos 
Verificados nas Escolas Espiritas das Casas Penais do Estado da 
Guanabara. Rio de Janeiro: Borsoi, 1965. 
Meade, T. "Civilizing" Rio: Reform and Resistance in a Brazilian City, 1889-
1930. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1997. 
Morse, R. and]. Hardey. Rethinking the Latin American City. Washing-
ton, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993. 
Mouffe, C. Dimensions of Radical Democracy. London: Verso, 1992. 
_.The Return of the Political. London: Verso, 1993. 
0 Globo. Rio de Janeiro. Various. 
Pino, J. Family and Favela: The Reproduction of Poverty in Rio de Janeiro. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996. 
Pinheiro, P., ed. Crime, Violencia e Poder. Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983. 
Rabinow, P. French Modern: Norms and Fonns of the Social Environment. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989. 
Salvatore, R. and C. Aguirre, eds. The Birth of the Penitenriary in Lalin 
America. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1996. 
Santos, Wanderley Guilherme dos. Burguesia e Ordem Liberal no Brasil. 
Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1978. 
Schwarcz, L. 0 Espetaculo das Ra~as. Sao Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 
1993. 
Shields, R. Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies of Modernity. 
London: Routledge, 1991. 
Sibley, D. Outsiders in Urban Societies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1981. 
Singer, P. Reparti~iio da Renda: Pobres e Ricos Sob o Regime Militar. Rio de 
Janeiro: Zahar, 1986. 
Soja, E. W. Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical So-
cial Theory. London: Verso, 1989. 
_. "Heterotopologies: A Remembrance of Other Spaces in the Cita-
del-LA." Strategies 3 (1990): 6-39. 
Somers, M. "Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Com-
munity, and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy." 
American Sociological Review 58 (1993): 587-620. 
Souza, P. A Maior Violencia do Mundo: Baixada Fluminense. Sao Paulo: 
Trac;o, 1980. 
162 
Pariahs of the Wonderful City 
Stewart, L. "Louisiana Subjects: Power, Space, and the Slave Body." 
Ecu111e11e 2 (1995): 227-245. 
Stoler, A. Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality 
and tlte Colonial Order of Things. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1995. 
Stuckenbruck, D. 0 Rio de Janeiro Em Questiio: 0 Plano Agache e o Ideario 
Reformista dos Anos 20. Rio de Janeiro: Observatorio de Politicas 
Urbanas e Gestao Municipal, 1996. 
Westwood, S. and]. Williams, eds. Imagining Cities. London: Routledge, 
1997. 
Zaluar, A. "Condominio do Diabo: As Classes Populares Urbanas e a 
Logica do Ferro e do Furno." Crime, Violencia, e Poder. Ed. P. 
Pinheiro. Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983. 
_ . "Urban Viol nee, Ci tizenship, and Public Policies." International 
/011r11al of Urba11 and Regio11al Research 17.1 (1993): 57-81. 
163 
